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Saying What They Mean: The False Claims Act
Amendments in the Wake of Allison Engine
i. introduction
The power of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) has ebbed and flowed throughout
the Act’s history.1 What initially began as a robust law against fraud found itself
weakened during World War II due to concerns about redundant litigation,2 result-
ing in the law being all but forgotten.3 Concerned with the loss of this anti-fraud
tool, Congress amended the Act in 1986 with much success.4 However, the courts
began to chip away at the Act’s foundation as they interpreted the Act’s language,
culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders.5 In response to the Court’s attacks on the FCA, Congress
again amended the Act in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
(“FERA”).6 Through FERA, the tide has again turned the FCA into a powerful
weapon against those who wish to defraud the federal government
(“Government”).7
This comment first discusses the history and language of the FCA through its
various incarnations.8 Next, the comment traces the court’s statutory interpretation
of the FCA,9 focusing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison Engine.10 Then,
the comment examines Congress’s response to Allison Engine through the FERA
amendments.11 Finally, the comment compares the new statutory language to the
© 2010 Jeremy E. Gersh.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Economics, University of
Maryland, College Park, May 2004.
1. See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. E1295–96 (daily ed. Jun. 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Berman) (describing the
history of the FCA from its enactment through the 1986 amendments).
2. See, e.g., id. (detailing the 1943 amendments).
3. See id. (“From 1943 to 1986, fewer than ten [FCA] cases were brought each year.”).
4. See, e.g., Anthony L. DeWitt, Badges? We Don’t Need No Stinking Badges! Citizen Attorney Generals and
the False Claims Act, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 30, 31 & n.12 (1996).
5. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008); see also infra Part II.C.
6. Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C.).
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.D.
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Saying What They Mean
Court’s decision in Allison Engine to show how the new statute changes the law and
reflects what Congress really meant to say.12
ii. legal background
A. The False Claims Act
Procurement by the United States government has a long and infamous history of
fraud and abuse.13 Congress enacted the FCA to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in
federal contracting.14 The FCA creates civil liability against persons who make cer-
tain false statements or claims to the Government.15 Congress enacted the FCA,
originally known as the “Informer’s Act” and the “Lincoln Law,” in 1863, during
the Civil War in response to alleged fraud, defective weapons, and price-gouging of
the Union Army.16
The FCA received a major revision in 1986 due to congressional concerns about
significant fraud in government procurement.17 The 1986 Act required the false
claim to be paid “by the Government” for the first time,18 and removed the require-
ment for specific intent.19 The Act established the burden of proof required in FCA
cases, requiring the plaintiff to prove all elements by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.20 Congress also revised the statute of limitations to the longer of six years
12. See infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1–8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–73 (describing
the extent of fraud in Government procurement).
14. See 155 Cong. Rec. E1295 (daily ed. Jun. 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Berman) (stating Congress
enacted FCA due to fraud and corruption during the Civil War).
15. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273 (“Originally the
act provided for both civil and criminal penalties assessed against one who was found to knowingly have
submitted a false claim to the Government.”).
16. 1 John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and QUI TAM Actions 1-3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2009). The 1863
Act prohibited frauds against the United States in the form of fictitious claims, false vouchers or papers, or
delivery of false receipts, with a possible punishment of fines and imprisonment. Law of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67,
12 Stat. 696, 696–97 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006)).
17. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2–3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267–68.
18. See False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, sec. 2, § 3729, 100 Stat. 3153, 3153
(1986) (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)) (inserting “by the Government” after “approved’” in
subsection (a)(2)). However, Congress was clear that the FCA was not limited only to claims directly presented
to the Government. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275 (stating
that claims are actionable when made to parties other than the Government if payment would result in Gov-
ernment loss or the funds were financed by the Government).
19. United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The pre-1986 version of the Act “im-
posed civil liability for ‘knowingly’ submitting a false claim.” Id. The pre-1986 Act contained numerous refer-
ences to “knowingly.” Compare Pub. L. No. 97-259, sec. 1, § 3729, 96 Stat. 877, 978 (1982), amended by Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (to be
codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)) (not having a separate section defining “knowingly” to include acts without
specific intent), with Pub. L. No. 99-562, sec. 2, § 3729, 100 Stat. 3152, 3154 (1986), amended by Fraud En-
forcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (to be codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)) (expanding definition of “knowingly” to include “acts in deliberate ignorance” or
“reckless disregard” of the truth).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1623 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d)).
126 journal of business & technology law
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from the initial violation, or three years from the date the violation was known or
should have been reasonably known to the Government, but in no event to exceed
ten years.21 The 1986 Act increased penalties to “not less than $5,000 and not more
than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains
because of the [false claims].”22 Finally, in an effort to encourage more private suits
on the Government’s behalf,23 Congress expanded the rights of private qui tam
relators, allowing private parties to continue participating in the action,24 increasing
relator’s percentage of recovery,25 and creating a federal cause of action for employ-
ees discriminated against due to his or her participation in an FCA suit.26
The right of private qui tam27 actions to enforce the FCA started in the original
1863 Act.28 First receiving popular use in thirteenth-century England,29 qui tam
actions allowed private parties to initiate actions to redress public wrongs.30 To
ensure that qui tam actions do not conflict with the Government’s investigation of
FCA violations, the Act requires qui tam relators to file FCA suits under seal and
serve the Government for a determination of whether the Government will join the
suit.31 Even if the Government initially decides not to join the suit, it may intervene
at a later time with “good cause.”32 The qui tam relator may continue to participate
in a case where the Government intervenes, subject to certain limitations.33 The
21. Id. § 3731(b).
22. Id. § 3729(a), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4,
123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23.
23. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 23–24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288–89.
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). When the Government intervenes, relator may recover “at least 15 percent but
not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim.” Id. § 3720(d)(1). When
there is no Government intervention, relator may recover “not less than 25 percent and not more than 30
percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” Id. § 3730(d)(2).
25. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5292 (explaining the in-
crease in qui tam relator recovery percentages).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21,
sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1624–25 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(h)).
27. “Qui tam is the abbreviation for the phrase ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur,’ which translates as ‘he who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’”
Boese, supra note 16, at 1-7 (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769
n.1 (2000)).
28. Law of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 698 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006))
(stating the FCA suits “may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself as for the United
States”).
29. See Boese, supra note 16, at 1-7.
30. Id. at 1-7 to 1-8. Qui tam actions moved to America with the early colonists, and “10 of the first 14
statutes enacted by the first United States Congress relied on some form of qui tam action.” Id. (citing United
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). The Su-
preme Court upheld the use of qui tam actions in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess. 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943)
(finding that qui tam relators “contribute[ ] much to accomplishing one of the purposes for which the [False
Claims] Act was passed”).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
32. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
33. Id. § 3730(c)(1). The Government may dismiss or settle the action, both notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the qui tam relator if there has been notice provided and a hearing. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(B). The court
may also limit the number, length of testimony, and cross-examination of witnesses by the qui tam relator if it
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 127
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Saying What They Mean
revisions to the qui tam provisions have “let loose a posse of ad hoc deputies to
uncover and prosecute frauds against the government.”34
B. Pre-Allison Engine Case Law
Prior to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Allison Engine, the circuit courts of appeals
were relatively consistent in their treatment of the FCA, by requiring presentment
of a false or fraudulent claim to the Government.35 One court stated that
“[a]lthough § 3729(a)(2) prohibits the submission of a false record or statement, it
does so only when the submission of the record or statement was done in an at-
tempt to get a false claim paid,”36 and that false statements on their own, when not
accompanying an attempt to get paid, do not constitute violations of the FCA.37
Another court emphasized that “[t]he submission of a claim is . . . the sine qua non
of a False Claims Act violation.”38 By requiring presentment, the courts focused not
on the underlying fraudulent claims, but rather on the actual “claim for
payment.”39
While following the same general presentment requirements of the other cir-
cuits, the Third Circuit established a more comprehensive test for presentment.40
To establish a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), the Third Circuit required the
plaintiff to show that: “(1) the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an
agent of the United States a claim for payment; (2) the claim was false or fraudu-
lent; and (3) the defendant knew the claim was false or fraudulent.”41 Finding that
would interfere with or unduly delay the Government, as well as “otherwise limit[ ] the participation by the
[qui tam relator] in the litigation.” Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
34. United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir.
1992).
35. See United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., No. 1-:95-CV-970, 2005 WL 713569, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 11, 2005) (“At least nine Federal Circuit Courts have determined that a defendant must, in claims
based upon [31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1) and (a)(2)], show that a false or fraudulent claim was submitted to the
Government.”), rev’d, 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
36. United States v. Southland Management Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2003).
37. See id. (“There is no liability under [the FCA] for a false statement unless it is used to get [sic] false
claim paid.”).
38. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The False
Claims Act does not create liability merely for . . . disregard of Government regulations or improper internal
policies unless, as a result of such acts, the provider knowingly asks the Government to pay amounts it does not
owe.”).
39. United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Kitsap Physicians
Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It seems to be a fairly obvious notion that a False Claims Act suit
ought to require a false claim.”); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 794 (4th Cir.
1999) (finding a cause of action under the FCA where defendant “submitted a certification known to be false”);
Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998) (“To prove allegations brought under the
FCA, then, relators must show that a claim for payment from the government was made and that the claim was
false or fraudulent.” (internal quotations omitted)).
40. United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2004); see also United States
ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 2004).
41. Zimmer, 386 F.3d at 242 (quoting Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.
2001)).
128 journal of business & technology law
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“mere awareness that another may . . . make such a [false] claim does not alone
constitute ‘causing a false claim to be presented,’ ”42 the court stated that “[i]n order
to prove a claim under § 3729(a)(2), a plaintiff must also show that the defendant
made or used (or caused someone else to make or use) a false record in order to
cause the false claim to be actually paid or approved.”43
The principal FCA case prior to Allison Engine is United States ex rel. Totten v.
Bombardier Corp.44 In Totten, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia found that the plain language of the FCA required presentment to the Gov-
ernment.45 Tying together the language of the statute, the court found that “False
Claims Act liability will attach if the Government provides the funds to the grantee
upon presentment of a claim to the Government.”46 Further, liability attached “if the
Government—again, upon presentment of the claim—reimburses the grantee for
funds that the grantee has already disbursed to the claimant.”47 In short, the Totten
court was clear that presentment to the Government was a necessary requirement
for liability under the FCA, and since there was no presentment to the Government
in that case,48 the plaintiffs did not satisfy the presentment requirement.49
The court went further and looked to the legislative history of the FCA to deter-
mine whether presentment to a grantee would satisfy the statute.50 Under the FCA,
the court found there was no way the language could be satisfied by claims
presented to a grantee of Government funds such as Amtrak.51 Although the plain-
tiffs argued that Congress intended to allow presentment to a grantee in the statute,
42. Id. at 245 (quoting United States ex rel. Shaver v. Lucas Western Corp., 237 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2001)).
43. Id. at 242.
44. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In Totten, the relator “brought a qui tam action against Bombardier
Corporation and Envirovac, Inc., alleging that those companies violated the [FCA] by delivering allegedly
defective rail cars to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) and submitting invoices to Amtrak
for payment from an account that included federal funds.” Id. at 490.
45. See id. at 493.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 491 (“Amtrak’s organic statute has flatly stated that the company ‘is not a department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.’ ” (citing 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3) (2000))). Addi-
tionally, “the Government candidly concedes that ‘Congress has specified that Amtrak is not itself an agency of
the Government.’ ” Id. at 491–92 (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 493.
50. See id. at 493–97. “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Id. at 494
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
51. The court found three reasons why the statute should not be read to allow presentment to grantees.
First, “extending False Claims Act liability here seems to result in quadruple liability for false claimants: a
grantee could presumably bring suit and obtain a recovery for itself, in addition to the treble damages the
Government and the relator divvy up under the Act.” Id. at 496. Second, the court was concerned that “author-
izing suit on behalf of an entity to which a claim was not presented raises complicated questions in applying
the statute’s scienter requirement.” Id. The court was unsure how the “knowingly presents” element of the FCA
applies when there is “no . . . requirement of presentment to the Government.” Id. Finally, the court expressed
concern that “an ‘effective’ presentment approach would make the potential reach of the Act almost bound-
less.” Id.
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 129
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Saying What They Mean
the court noted that “Congress could readily have done just that—amend[ed] sub-
section (a)(1) to provide that claims be presented to the Government or a grantee
or recipient of Government funds.”52 Prior to Allison Engine, the case law established
that presentment to the Government is a necessary element of the FCA.53
C. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex. rel Sanders
In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,54 the Supreme Court of the
United States vacated and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit55 and held that for liability to occur under the FCA, “a plaintiff assert-
ing a § 3729(a)(2) claim must prove that the defendant intended that the false
record or statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the
false claim.”56
1. Facts and Case History
The underlying claims in Allison Engine arose from a contract between the United
States Navy and Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding (“the shipyards”) in
1985, for the production of a new fleet of guided missile destroyers.57 The shipyards
contracted with Allison Engine Company, Inc. (“Allison Engine”) to build genera-
tor sets for the destroyers.58 Allison Engine contracted with General Tool Company
(“GTC”) to assemble the generator sets, who in turn contracted with Southern
Ohio Fabricators, Inc. (“SOFCO”), for manufacture of the bases and enclosures of
the generator sets.59 The total cost for each destroyer was $1 billion, of which Al-
lison Engine was paid $3 million, GTC was paid $800,000, and SOFCO was paid
$100,000.60 Ultimately, all funds came from the United States Treasury.61 The prime
contract between the Navy and the shipyards contained specifications for every part
of the destroyer, and the contract required that the generator sets be delivered with
a certificate of conformance, which certifies the unit was manufactured in accor-
dance with the contract specifications.62 Each subcontract incorporated these
requirements.63
52. Id. Rather, the language of § 3729(a)(1) did not include any mention of grantees or recipients. 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec.
4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23. This part of Totten was a contributing factor to the 2009 changes to the FCA. See
infra Part II.D.
53. See supra notes 35–52 and accompanying text.
54. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
55. Id. at 2131.
56. Id. at 2126.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2126–27.
60. Id. at 2127.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
130 journal of business & technology law
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In 1995, Roger L. Sanders and Roger L. Thacker (collectively, “the relators”),
both former employees of GTC, filed suit in the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, bringing claims under the FCA64 as qui tam relators, claiming that
the invoices submitted by Allison Engine, GTC, and SOFCO sought payment for
work that was not performed in accordance with contract requirements.65 After the
close of the relators’ case in the jury trial, Allison Engine filed a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a),66 assert-
ing no reasonable jury could find for the relators because there was no evidence
that Allison Engine presented a false or fraudulent claim to the Navy.67 The District
Court found that the FCA required the presentment of a false or fraudulent claim
to the Government to establish a violation of the FCA68 and granted Allison En-
gine’s motion.69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in a divided
opinion.70 Finding that the “Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the
FCA is a remedial statute and should be construed broadly,”71 the majority found
no presentment requirement under the FCA.72 Instead of merely requiring a show-
ing that false claims were presented to the Government, in addition “a relator . . .
must show that government money was used to pay the false or fraudulent claim.”73
The Sixth Circuit recognized its ruling conflicted with the District of Columbia
Circuit’s ruling in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.74 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the proper
interpretation of subsection (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the FCA.75
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)–(3) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729(a), 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23.
65. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2127. The relators specifically claimed that “the gearboxes installed by
Allison Engine in the first 52 [generator sets] were defective and leaked oil; that GTC never conducted a
required final quality inspection for approximately half of the first 67 [generator sets]; and that the SOFCO
welders who worked on the first 67 [generator sets] did not meet military standards.” Id. Further, the relators
alleged that Allison Engine “issued [certificates of conformance] claiming falsely that the [generator sets] had
been built to the contractually required specifications even though [Allison Engine] knew that those specifica-
tions had not been met.” Id.
66. The court may grant judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) when “the court finds that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
67. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., No. 1-:95-CV-970, 2005 WL 713569, at *11 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 11, 2005), rev’d, 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
68. See id. at *10 (“[A] violation of subsection (a)(2) of the FCA requires a showing that a false or fraudu-
lent claim has been submitted to an officer or employee of the United States Government.”).
69. Id. at *11.
70. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 627 (6th Cir. 2006).
71. Id. at 618.
72. See id. at 616 (“[T]he plain language of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) simply does not require that a
claim must be presented to the government to be actionable.”).
73. Id. at 622.
74. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see supra Part II.B.
75. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 552 U.S. 989 (2007).
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 131
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2. The Court’s Decision
In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,76 the Supreme Court of the
United States vacated and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit77 and held that for liability to occur under the FCA, “a plaintiff assert-
ing a § 3729(a)(2) claim must prove that the defendant intended that the false
record or statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the
false claim.”78 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Samuel Alito began the opin-
ion by looking at the language of the statute.79 First looking to the § 3729(a)(2)
claim, the Court found the language of the statute required that “the defendant
must make the false record or statement ‘to get’ a false or fraudulent claim ‘paid or
approved by the Government.’ ”80 The Court found that “ ‘[t]o get’ denotes pur-
pose,” and the defendant must “have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent
claim ‘paid or approved by the Government’ in order to be liable under
§ 3729(a)(2).”81 The Court went further in finding that getting a claim “ ‘paid . . .
by the Government’” is not the same as Government funds paying the claim,82
rather requiring the defendant intend for the Government itself to pay the claim.83
Citing both Rainwater v. United States84 and United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombar-
dier Corp.,85 the Court emphasized the need to limit the FCA to “its intended role
of combating ‘fraud against the Government.’”86
The Court next addressed the Government’s contention “that the phrase ‘paid
. . . by the Government’ does not mean that the Government must literally pay the
bill.”87 Rather, “[t]he Government maintain[ed] that it is customary to say that the
Government pays a bill when a person who has received Government funds uses
those funds to pay a bill.”88 The Court rejected this argument “because it involves a
colloquial usage of the phrase ‘paid by.’ ”89 The Court also rejected the Govern-
ment’s argument “that the definition of the term ‘claim’ in § 3729(c) means that
76. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
77. Id. at 2131.
78. Id. at 2126.
79. Id. at 2128 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. 356 U.S. 590 (1958).
85. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
86. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2128.
87. Id. at 2128–29.
88. Id. at 2129. The Government illustrated this idea with an example: “[W]hen a student says that his
college living expenses are ‘paid by’ his parents, he typically does not mean that his parents send checks directly
to his creditors. Rather, he means that his parents are the ultimate source of the funds he uses to pay those
expenses.” Id. (quoting Totten, 380 F.3d at 506 (Garland, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. The Court used the example that an employee of the Government would not say that a new car or
vacation was paid by the Government, even though the employee’s ultimate income was from the Government.
Id.
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§ 3729(a)(2)’s use of the phrase ‘paid by the government’ should not be read liter-
ally.”90 The Court’s interpretation of “claim” did not require a request for money or
property to be made directly to the Government.91 A “claim” could be a request
made to “a contractor, grantee, or other recipient” if the Government provides the
funds or reimburses the party to which the claim was presented.92
Additionally, the Court found that because presentment is included in
§ 3729(a)(1) and not mentioned in (a)(2), this “suggests that Congress did not
intend to include a presentment requirement in subsection (a)(2).”93 The Court set
the requirement of § 3729(a)(2) as “not proof that the defendant caused a false
record or statement to be presented or submitted to the Government but that the
defendant made a false record or statement for the purpose of getting ‘a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.’ ”94 A subcontractor, such as
Allison Engine, would “violate[ ] § 3729(a)(2) if [it] submit[ted] a false statement
to the prime contractor intending for the statement to be used by the prime con-
tractor to get the Government to pay its claim,” but would not violate § 3729(a)(2)
if the subcontractor “[did] not intend the Government to rely on that false state-
ment as a condition of payment.”95 The Court focused on fraud directed toward the
Government, not wanting to “transform the FCA into an all-purpose anti-fraud
statute.”96
Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s complaint under § 3729(a)(3), which
is the conspiracy provision of the FCA.97 Finding the interpretation of this section
similar to § 3729(a)(2), the Court stated “it is not enough for a plaintiff to show
that the alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that had the effect of
causing a private entity to make payments using money obtained from the Govern-
ment.”98 To be liable under this subsection, the defendants must have “had the
purpose of ‘getting’ the false record or statement to bring about the Government’s
payment of a false or fraudulent claim.”99 Plaintiffs did not need to show any intent
to present the false record or statement to the Government, but had to show that
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 2129–30 (“ ‘[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002))).
94. Id. at 2130.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Section 3729(a)(3) makes liable any person who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a
false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23.
98. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130.
99. Id.
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the defendants “agreed that the false record or statement would have a material
effect on the Government’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim.”100
D. Congressional Response to Allison Engine
In the wake of the Court’s decision in Allison Engine, Congress reacted by propos-
ing, although not enacting, amendments to overturn Allison Engine and remove
any presentment requirement from the statute.101 In late 2008 and early 2009, as the
global economy fell into recession,102 the federal government attempted to stimu-
late the economy through a number of measures.103 Many of these measures in-
volved the Government directly giving private entities money.104 Out of a desire to
protect the Government from being defrauded out of this stimulus money,105 the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) was born.106
On May 20, 2009, President Barack Obama signed FERA into law.107 While the
general purpose of this bill was to “reinvigorate our Nation’s capacity to investigate
and prosecute” financial fraud,108 FERA also included a section to “amend[ ] the
FCA to clarify and correct erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in
Allison Engine . . . and . . . Totten . . . .”109 Congress was clear that it did not agree
with the Court in Allison Engine.110
100. Id. at 2130–31. The Court cited Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), as in accord with this
decision. Id. at 2131. The Allison Engine Court interpreted Tanner’s holding to mean that “a conspiracy to
defraud a federally funded private entity does not constitute a ‘conspiracy to defraud the United States.’ ” Id.
(quoting Tanner, 483 U.S. at 129). Here, as in Tanner, the Court refused to extend a law designed to protect the
Government to protect private entities against fraud. Id.
101. See False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009, S. 458, 111th Cong. (2009); False Claims Act Correction
Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong. (2009); False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, S. 2041, 110th Cong.
(2008); False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. 4854, 110th Cong. (2007); see also Kevin M. Comeau,
False Certification Claims in Light of Allison Engine and False Claims Act Amendments Introduced in the 111th
Congress, 18 Fed. Cir. B.J. 491, 492–93 (2009).
102. See Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic
Activity (2008), http://www.nber.org/dec2008.html (stating the United States had been in a recession starting
December 2007).
103. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (“An Act
[m]aking supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy
efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization . . . .”).
104. See S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009) (“In response to the economic crisis, the Federal Government has
obligated and expended more than $1 trillion in an effort to stabilize our banking system and rebuild our
economy. These funds are often dispensed through contracts with non-governmental entities, going to general
contractors and subcontractors working for the Government.”).
105. See id. (“Protecting these funds from fraud and abuse must be among our highest priorities as we
move forward with these necessary actions.”).
106. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (to be codified at 31
U.S.C.).
107. President’s Statement on Signing the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Daily Comp.
Pres. Doc. 00387, (May 20, 2009).
108. S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 3 (2009).
109. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
110. See id.; see also 155 Cong. Rec. S4612 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“We are
trying to just, in this bill, in a very rifle shot way, correct some court opinions that have been detrimental and
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FERA completely rewrote § 3729 to return the statute to Congress’s original in-
tent.111 First, Congress rewrote § 3729(a)(2) by removing the phrase “paid or ap-
proved by the Government,”112 and focused on “a false or fraudulent claim.”113
Further, Congress added a materiality requirement to the FCA, defining materiality
as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the pay-
ment or receipt of money or property.”114 Now, a false statement only needs to be
“material to a false or fraudulent claim,”115 and there is no element of intent.116
FERA further redefines a claim as “any request or demand . . . for money” made to
either a Government officer or official or any “contractor, grantee, or other recipi-
ent” when the Government either provided or would reimburse the funds paid.117
These changes now allow a cause of action under the FCA for claims made by
subcontractors to prime contractors under a federal government contract, such as
in Allison Engine,118 or by prime or subcontractors to non-Governmental entities
receiving Government money, such as in Totten.119 The effective date of FERA’s
amendments to § 3729(a)(1) is retroactive to June 7, 2008, two days before the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Allison Engine,120 ensuring no subcon-
tractor or grantee claims would be decided by the FCA as interpreted in Allison
Engine and Totten.121 FERA restores the FCA to “[o]ne of the most successful tools
for combating waste and abuse in Government spending.”122
weaken the False Claims Act.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S4536 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(“[T]here were also judicial interpretations of the False Claims Act which this legislation will correct.”); 155
Cong. Rec. S4540 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]he purpose of the new definition of
‘claim’ is to overrule the Totten and Allison Engine cases.”).
111. See S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009) (describing the original intent of the FCA as a “civil enforcement
tool” against any entity that attempted to defraud the Government).
112. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) (amended 2009), with Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–22.
113. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621
(to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)).
114. Id. sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)).
115. Id. sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)).
116. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
117. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617,
1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d)(2)).
118. Defendants in Allison Engine were subcontractors. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
128 S. Ct. 2123, 2126–27 (2008). Therefore, they would fall under § 3729(b)(2)’s definition of a contractor
being reimbursed with funding provided by the Government. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)).
119. The false claim in Totten was presented to Amtrak, which, although not a Governmental entity, re-
ceived Government funds. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 491–92 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
120. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2123 (decided June 9, 2008).
121. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4(f), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625
(applying the revisions to § 3729(a)(1) to all claims applying on or after June 7, 2008).
122. S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
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iii. analysis
In Allison Engine, the Court properly limited the scope of FCA claims to prevent
the Act from becoming an all-purpose anti-fraud statute.123 However, the Allison
Engine Court went too far in limiting the scope of the Act when it required subcon-
tractors to have intent to defraud the Government to violate the FCA, which Con-
gress corrected in FERA.124 Instead, the Supreme Court should have adopted a
standard that recognized the role of subcontractors in Government contracting,
and Congress ultimately incorporated this standard in the revised statute.125
A. Both the Allison Engine Court and FERA Properly Limited the Scope of the
False Claims Act to Prevent It from Becoming an All-Purpose Anti-Fraud
Statute
The Supreme Court was correct in Allison Engine when it refused to “transform the
[False Claims Act] into an all-purpose anti-fraud statute.”126 The purpose of the
FCA “is to enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses sustained as a result
of fraud against the Government.”127 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986,
the primary purpose for the amendment was Congress’s desire to change the “sad
truth . . . that crime against the Government often does pay.”128 Of the federal
government’s fiscal year 1985 budget, approaching nearly $1 trillion, the Depart-
ment of Justice estimated between $10 and $100 billion was lost to fraud.129 The
evidence contained in the legislative history of the 1986 amendments focused on
high-profile reports and testimony about the state of Government procurement in
the mid-1980s.130
What was not contained in the legislative history was any indication that Con-
gress intended the FCA to combat fraud against entities other than the Govern-
ment.131 For example, one court refused to extend the FCA to claims against non-
Government entities in United States ex rel. Totten v Bombardier Corp.132 In Totten,
the relator alleged that the defendant submitted a false claim to Amtrak,133 which
the court noted was not a Governmental entity.134 The Totten court then focused on
the requirements in the FCA for presentment to an officer or employee of the
123. See infra Part III.A.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See infra Part III.C.
126. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 (2008).
127. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.
128. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., id. at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266 (stating that the purpose of the False Claims
Act is to reduce “fraud against the Government”) (emphasis added).
132. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to extend the FCA to non-governmental entities).
133. Id. at 490.
134. See id. at 491–92 (“Amtrak’s organic statute has flatly stated that the company ‘is not a department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.’ ” (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3) (2000))).
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Government135 and held that because the defendants presented claims to Amtrak, a
non-Government entity, the FCA did not apply, even though money provided by
the Government ultimately paid the false claims.136 This did not mean that Amtrak
was without remedy for the false claims submitted by the defendants, as they still
had all available remedies at law and equity for those actions.137 The court simply
limited the scope of the FCA to false claims against the Government, which was the
original intent of Congress when amending the statute.138
In Allison Engine, the Court had similar concerns, focusing on claims paid “by
the government.”139 The Court did not want to extend the scope of the FCA to false
claims presented to any entity that receives funding from the Government.140
Rather, the Court showed a desire to limit FCA claims to those with intent to
defraud the Government.141 The Court’s limitation of the FCA to the Government
was in-line with both congressional intent and prior court decisions.142
Although the FCA amendments removed the “by the Government” language,143
Congress still intended to limit the FCA to actions related to the Government.144
FERA’s preamble states the purpose of the act is “[t]o improve enforcement of . . .
frauds related to Federal assistance and relief programs.”145 Congressional testi-
mony also indicates that the reach of the FCA amendments targets those who at-
tempt or succeed in obtaining tax dollars without the right to do so.146 However,
there is some concern that the new definition of “claim” in FERA could extend the
FCA beyond what the courts previously allowed.147 This concern is somewhat exag-
135. Id. at 492.
136. Id. at 502.
137. A private entity may use any common law or statutory remedies, such as tort claims, contract claims,
and general anti-fraud statutes, to recover money that it fraudulently pays out.
138. See Totten, 380 F.3d at 495–96 (stating that Congress had the opportunity to expand the FCA beyond
claims presented to the Government, but chose not to).
139. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2128 (2008).
140. See id. at 2128–29 (using the example that a government employee would not say the government paid
for a new car or vacation, even though the government was the ultimate source of funds for those purchases).
141. Id. at 2130.
142. See, e.g., supra note 138.
143. See supra note 112.
144. See, e.g., Feature Comment: The Impact of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 on the Civil
False Claims Act, 51 Gov’t Contractor (West) ¶ 224, at 1 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter Impact of FERA] (“Congress
wanted to ensure that, as the Government was spending unprecedented amounts of taxpayer funds, it could
limit and recover for fraudulent uses of those funds.”).
145. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617, 1617.
146. See 155 Cong. Rec. E1297 (daily ed. Jun. 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Berman) (“[FERA] clarifies a
number of key provisions and reaffirms that the False Claims Act is intended to protect all Government funds,
without qualification or limitation, from the predation of those who would avail themselves of taxpayer money
without the right to do so.”).
147. See Impact of FERA, supra note 144, at 4 (describing how the new statute could allow “tracing” of funds
through Government agencies and how it could place liability on second-, third-, and lower-tier subcontrac-
tors). While the old FCA had an express “by the Government” requirement, see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006),
amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23,
FERA still requires some nexus to the Government. See id. sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (to be
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gerated, as the areas of concern still involve defrauded Government funds.148 While
FERA does expand the scope of the FCA, it does not create an all-purpose anti-
fraud statute.149
B. FERA Corrected the Allison Engine Court When It Went Too Far in Limiting
the Scope of the False Claims Act by Requiring Subcontractor Intent to
Defraud the Government
The Allison Engine Court narrowed the scope of the FCA considerably when it
required “that the defendant ma[ke] a false record or statement for the purpose of
getting ‘a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.’ ”150 In
reaching this holding, the Court focused on the “infinitive phrase ‘to get’ ” in
§ 3729(a)(2) and the “defendant’s purpose in making or using a false record or
statement.”151 The Court erred by severely narrowing the scope of the FCA because
the intent requirement could have caused formerly possible FCA violations by sub-
contractors to fall outside the scope of the statute.152
Allison Engine specifically addressed a situation where a subcontractor made the
alleged false claim.153 It is very common for federal contracts to have multiple layers
of subcontracting with numerous subcontractors.154 To find a subcontractor viola-
tion of the FCA, the Court created a standard under § 3729(a)(2) that required the
relator to prove that the subcontractor intended for their false record or statement
“to be used by the prime contractor to get the Government to pay its claim.”155
Proving intent can be a difficult hurdle to overcome,156 and this could have had the
codified at 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2)) (definition of claim requiring nexus to Government). However, the Act does
address a hypothetical proposed by Justice Alito in Allison Engine, where he noted a car or vacation purchased
by a federal employee should not fall under the FCA, even though the funds ultimately came from the Govern-
ment. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2129 (2009). FERA clearly states that
compensation for Federal employment is not covered under the act. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1623 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2)(B)).
148. See, e.g., False Claims Act Liability: Contracts with the Coalition Provisional Authority, 23 Nash &
Cibinic Rep. (West) ¶ 35, at 103 (July 2009) (discussing impact of FERA on funds from non-governmental
organizations such as the Iraqi Provisional Authority that received Government funds to operate).
149. See, e.g., Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617,
1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2)) (definition of claim requires the Government to provide or
reimburse the money used to pay the false claim).
150. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130.
151. Id. at 2130 n.2.
152. See infra notes 153–61 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part II.C.1.
154. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company is the prime contractor for the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor pro-
gram; however, there are “thousands” of suppliers working on the program. Lockheed Martin Corp., F-22
Raptor 5, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/corporate/press-kit/F-22-Brochure.pdf.
155. See Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130.
156. Although evidence of mental state to prove intent is admissible as an exclusion to the hearsay rule, see
Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), “intent is often difficult to prove.” Gen. Analytics Corp. v. CNA Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 51, 54
(4th Cir. 1995).
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effect of discouraging potential qui tam relators from pursuing claims against sub-
contractors that are potentially defrauding the Government.157
The Court’s decision also unnecessarily imposed an evidentiary hurdle.158 It is
difficult to fathom a reason why a subcontractor would knowingly submit a false
record or statement without the intent of receiving payment for work that the
subcontractor did not perform.159 Although it could be difficult to uncover evi-
dence proving the subcontractor intended for the Government to rely on the sub-
contractor’s false record or statement to induce payment of the false claim, there
could easily be a situation where a subcontractor submits a false inspection record
to the prime contractor with the hope of receiving payment, while never caring if
the prime contractor passed the falsified inspection record to the Government for
payment to the prime contractor.160 Under Allison Engine, this situation would fall
outside of the FCA, although it is the type of activity that the FCA was designed to
combat.161 The Court created a gaping hole in the FCA that limited the Govern-
ment’s and relator’s ability to prosecute FCA violations against subcontractors.162
Congress quickly filled this hole with FERA.163 By deleting the presentment re-
quirement, Congress removed any notion that a false claim must be presented di-
rectly to the Government.164 Rather, FERA creates a two-part test to determine
whether the FCA applies to a claim that is not presented directly to the Govern-
ment.165 First, the court must determine if the false claim was made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient for the Government’s interest or to advance a Govern-
ment program.166 Second, the court must determine if the Government provided or
planned in the future to reimburse the funds to pay the false claim.167 A typical
157. See, e.g., Stephan J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?,
23 J. L. Econ. & Org. 598, 599–602 (2007) (discussing how large hurdles such as expense and difficulty in
obtaining evidence can reduce meritorious litigation).
158. See Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130 (requiring the subcontractor or defendant to intend for the
Government to rely on the false claim to be a cause of action under the FCA).
159. Many FCA cases involve contractors allegedly submitting false invoices with the hopes of receiving
payment for them. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 943 (1997)
(relator alleged defendant improperly invoiced the government for costs that were associated with another,
less-profitable, contract); United States ex rel. DRC Inc. v. Custer Battles LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 299–300 (4th Cir.
2009) (relator alleged defendant improperly invoiced the government for more than the contract allowed).
160. This situation occurred in Allison Engine, where the defendants submitted falsified certificates of con-
formance in lieu of actually performing the required testing. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2127.
161. See supra Part II.B (explaining that the purpose of the FCA was to prevent fraud against the
Government).
162. See supra notes 150–61 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part II.D.
164. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. Of course, the FCA applies if the claim is presented to
the Government. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617,
1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(i)).
165. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
166. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617,
1623 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
167. See id.
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subcontractor false claim would fall under the FCA through this test, as the sub-
contractor would submit a false claim to the prime contractor, and the prime con-
tractor would submit a claim to the Government, seeking reimbursement for
expenses incurred in paying the subcontractor’s false claim.168 The FERA amend-
ment makes it clear that subcontractors are subject to the FCA.169 Although Allison
Engine severely limited subcontractor FCA suits, FERA restored their viability as a
cause of action.170
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Adopted a Middle-Ground Approach to
Reflect the Significant Involvement of Subcontractors in Government
Procurement, Which Congress Accomplished Through FERA
Rather than requiring a plaintiff to show that a subcontractor intended for the
Government to rely on its false record or statement to induce payment, the Court
should have adopted an approach that looks to the practical effect of the subcon-
tractor’s actions.171 When subcontractors are involved in a Government program,
they do not individually submit invoices to the Government; rather, the subcon-
tractors submit invoices to the prime contractor, who in turn invoices the Govern-
ment for all work done by the prime and subcontractors on the program.172 The
element of intent and presentment under the FCA should be determined at the
point where the subcontractor submits the false record or statement, which in the
typical subcontractor situation would be when the subcontractor submits its in-
voice to the prime contractor.173 If the subcontractor intended for the prime con-
tractor to rely on that false record or statement when generating the invoice to the
Government, who ultimately generates the funds to pay the subcontractor, then
that action should be a violation of the FCA, which Congress acknowledged in its
new definition of “claim.”174
The new congressional approach side-stepped the Allison Engine Court’s intent
requirement and adopted a middle-ground approach by implicitly acknowledging
the presence of subcontractors and their ability to make false claims through prime
168. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 31.201 (2008) (the Government will pay contractor costs that are allowable,
reasonable, and allocable).
169. See infra Part III.C. In addition, FERA overturned Totten by expressly allowing false claims to grantees,
such as Amtrak, to fall under the FCA. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21,
sec. 4, §3729, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
170. See supra notes 150–69.
171. See infra notes 172–90.
172. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 32.112-1 (2008) (providing subcontractor remedies if prime contractor fails to
make payments).
173. See, e.g., Cornell Univ., Office of Sponsored Programs, Subcontracting Procedures, http://www.osp.
cornell.edu/Policies/sub-proc.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2009) (procedures for subcontract administration re-
quires invoices be submitted to the university, who is the prime contractor).
174. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617,
1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
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contractors.175 In Allison Engine, the Court required that “a defendant must intend
that the Government itself pay the claim.”176 The subcontractor knows the work
they are doing is for the government; in Allison Engine, it would be hard to believe
that the defendants thought they were building components of a guided missile
destroyer for a private party.177 Rather, subcontractors who make false records or
statements want the prime contractor to take its invoice, include it with the in-
voices of the other subcontractors and the prime contractor’s work, and submit it
to the Government for payment.178 The intent to have the invoice ultimately sub-
mitted to and paid by the Government as required in Allison Engine is not required
in the new two-part test in FERA’s definition of a claim.179
The statutory revision acknowledged the concept of privity of contract.180 In a
typical contract, there is only privity between the Government and the prime con-
tractor.181 While there is no contractual relationship between the Government and
subcontractors, clauses contained in the prime contract often flow down to the
subcontracts.182 This concept reverses the “flow-down” approach such that any false
records or statements made by a subcontractor “flows up” through the prime con-
tractor to the Government.183 This also addresses a fairness issue raised in Allison
Engine: the Court was seemingly permitting subcontractors to hide behind the
prime contractor and avoid any FCA liability.184 If the intent of the 1986 Congress
was to restrict the reach of the FCA to prime contractors, that intent was hard to
decipher.185 Congress clarified in 2009 that the FCA intended to address all false
175. See id. (recognizing claims made to Government contractors that are ultimately paid with Government
funds—the situation seen in a subcontractor false claim).
176. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2128 (2008).
177. See id. at 2126. Even in situations where the program is not as obviously governmental as a guided
missile destroyer, the presence of federal acquisition clauses in the subcontract should provide adequate notice
that the program is funded by the Government. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.245-1 (2008) (clause requiring “appro-
priate flow down of contract terms and conditions” for government-furnished property).
178. It is unlikely that after producing fraudulent certificates of conformance, see Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct.
at 2127, the subcontractors wanted the prime contractor to investigate or otherwise check to ensure the sub-
contractors actually performed the work.
179. See supra notes 154–57, 165–67 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
181. See Globex Corp. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 343, 347 (2002) (“[S]ubcontractors typically are not in
privity of contract with the Government . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.245-1 (2008) (containing clause that requires “appropriate flow down of con-
tract terms and conditions” for government furnished property).
183. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, § 3729, 123 Stat. 1617,
1622–23 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)) (definition of claim allows false claims by subcontractors
when the subcontractor is paid with Government funds in support of a Government program regardless of the
involvement of the prime contractor).
184. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2128 (2008) (requiring that “a
defendant must intend that the Government itself pay the claim”). This is impossible in the typical subcontrac-
tor situation, as there is no privity with the Government. See supra note 181.
185. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266 (False Claims Reform Act
addressed “fraud against the Government,” but did not limit that fraud to prime contractors).
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Saying What They Mean
records or statements made to the Government, and that subcontractors should be
equally susceptible to suit under the FCA.186
Through FERA, Congress restored the FCA to its original intent: a powerful
weapon to combat fraud against the Government.187 FERA legislatively overturns
the prior stalwarts of FCA jurisprudence, Totten and Allison Engine, and paves the
way for a flood of lawsuits attacking false claims by not only prime contractors, as
previously allowed, but their subcontractors as well.188 Subcontractors should be on
notice that their actions will be scrutinized by potential qui tam relators.189 Though
there may be a potential backlash, Government money is ultimately taxpayer
money, and it should be spent in a prudent manner free of fraud and waste.190
iv. conclusion
Throughout the history of the FCA, the statute’s power has risen and fallen.191 In
recent legislation, Congress agreed with the Allison Engine Court that the FCA
should only target fraud against the Government,192 but differed with the Court in
its approach to subcontractor fraud, opting for the FCA to include all fraud that is
perpetrated against Government funds.193 While there is concern that FERA may
extend the scope of the FCA beyond Governmental fraud,194 the amendments put
all federal contractors on notice that they could be liable for any false claims made
under Government contracts.195 The FERA amendments restore the FCA to its
place as a powerful tool to fight fraud against the Government.196
186. See supra Part II.D.
187. See supra Part II.D.
188. See supra Part III.C.
189. See supra Part III.C.
190. See supra Part II.D.
191. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. See supra Part III.B.
194. See supra Part III.B.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See supra Part III.C.
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